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Based on an interdisciplinary perspective, we discuss how primary-process, anoetic forms
of consciousness emerge into higher forms of awareness such as knowledge-based
episodic knowing and self-aware forms of higher-order consciousness like autonoetic
awareness. Anoetic consciousness is defined as the rudimentary state of affective, home-
ostatic, and sensory-perceptual mental experiences. It can be considered as the auto-
nomic flow of primary-process phenomenal experiences that reflects a fundamental form
of first-person “self-experience,” a vastly underestimated primary form of phenomenal
consciousness. We argue that this anoetic form of evolutionarily refined consciousness
constitutes a critical antecedent that is foundational for all forms of knowledge acquisition
via learning and memory, giving rise to a knowledge-based, or noetic, consciousness as
well as higher forms of “awareness” or “knowing consciousness” that permits “time-
travel” in the brain-mind. We summarize the conceptual advantages of such a multi-tiered
neuroevolutionary approach to psychological issues, namely from genetically controlled pri-
mary (affective) and secondary (learning and memory), to higher tertiary (developmentally
emergent) brain-mind processes, along with suggestions about how affective experiences
become more cognitive and object-oriented, allowing the developmental creation of more
subtle higher mental processes such as episodic memory which allows the possibility
of autonoetic consciousness, namely looking forward and backward at one’s life and its
possibilities within the “mind’s eye.”
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FROM UNKNOWING TO KNOWING LEVELS OF
CONSCIOUSNESS
Our evolutionary theoretical approach of understanding con-
sciousness focuses on how lower levels of primary-process affective
experience or “anoetic” consciousness emerge gradually by learn-
ing and memory into autonoetic consciousness through a progres-
sive developmental maturation of the brain and mind (Panksepp,
1998a, 2005, 2007, 2008; Tulving, 2004, 2005; Vandekerckhove,
2009; Vandekerckhove and Panksepp, 2009, 2011). Anoetic con-
sciousness reflects a primal state of autonomic-phenomenal awak-
eness, with direct experiences of oneself and the world – namely,
an unknowing or “anoetic” (without explicit knowledge) con-
sciousness consisting of perceptual, motoric-procedural and var-
ious primal emotional, homeostatic, and sensory affective states
(Panksepp, 1998a; Merker, 2007). These brain-body states are
all heavily dependent on subcortical neural networks, thalamic
sensory relay nuclei, basal ganglia, and especially midline mesen-
cephalic and diencephalic attentional and affective systems, which
permit other neural circuits to evolve developmentally toward
knowing about the world. “Knowing about the world” consists
of “noetic” consciousness, based on semantic memory, relying
on brain intermediate regions such as basal ganglia (amygdala,
nucleus accumbens, etc.), the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, tem-
poral lobes, and “autonoetic consciousness,” which is supported
by high-order neocortical areas (especially parietal, prefrontal,
and temporal) and is mediated by self-reflective mental states
within time and environmental contexts. These “knowing states of
consciousness”allow for higher mental activities, especially experi-
ential“time-travel”consisting of the re-experience of past events in
the service of future plans (Vandekerckhove and Panksepp, 2011).
For instance, prefrontal and temporal activations are involved
in the elaboration of higher ideographic cognitive semantic and
episodic representations relying on anoetic consciousness related
to diverse higher-order affective self-experiences supported by
limbic structures as the amygdala, insula, and anterior cingu-
late cortex, along with increasingly complex implicit procedural
representations that involve the motor cortex.
Each higher state of consciousness depends ultimately, not only
on individual lived experiences, but on those extensive primary-
process, evolutionarily provided networks of universal bodily
existence, through various synchronizing and desynchronizing
patterns of firings of diverse neural networks that are gradually
beginning to be understood. In other words, that which came
first in brain-mind evolution sustains a foundational influence on
all higher forms of cognitive consciousness that we cherish. This
integrative multilevel view helps us understand how an enormous
number of conscious experiences emerge from the continuous
multi-tiered flows of affective dynamics that we experience in our
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daily life. Anoetic affective consciousness emerges from inherited
functions of the brain, where various positive affective feelings
reflect survival trajectories, while various negative affective feel-
ings anticipate potential pathways of destruction (Panksepp and
Biven, 2012).
Through the unconscious mechanisms of learning and mem-
ory, these affects are connected to environmental events in order to
promote more sophisticated anticipatory behaviors through learn-
ing, and with gradual culture-promoted integration, into higher
cognitive-processes that allow for internal evaluative reflections
related to recall of past memories and “mind-travel” or “autonoe-
sis.” These layered levels of consciousness are hierarchically struc-
tured whereby the higher levels of consciousness are more recently
emergent states of the brain, which certainly are phylogenetically
more recent and develop later in infancy (Vandekerckhove, 2009;
Vandekerckhove and Panksepp, 2009).
Crucial here, in the transition from anoetic to autonoetic con-
sciousness are the variety of fine-grained neuronal associative
processes of the basal ganglia and limbic system, integrating an
implicit level of unconscious neural processing that allows for
learning and memory. In other words, we do not experience the
brain mechanisms of learning and memory, only their results.
This underlying form of primary-process form of anoetic affec-
tive consciousness which is instantiated in diverse forms of qualia,
including primal affective feelings,has often been neglected in con-
sciousness studies (Panksepp, 1998a, 2007; Merker, 2007; Vandek-
erckhove, 2009; Solms and Panksepp, 2012). Such primal founda-
tional processes have often been deemed to be deeply unconscious
or “unexperienced,” but this is not the case for the uncondi-
tional positive and negative feelings that arise from this level of
neural processing (Panksepp, 1998a, 2005, 2007, 2008). Anoetic
consciousness is constituted from “here and now” pre-reflective
phenomenal experiences, not requiring higher-order forms of self-
reflective consciousness subsumed by the concept of “awareness”
(Solms and Panksepp, 2012). At the empirical level, evidence for
this is provided by the fact that wherever in subcortical regions
of the brain we can activate coherent emotional behaviors with
electrical deep brain stimulation (DBS), those induced internal
states are routinely “rewarding” and “punishing” in animal models
(Panksepp, 1982, 1998a, 2005; Panksepp and Biven, 2012), cor-
responding perhaps to distinct human emotional feelings, since
humans commonly report categorically distinct affective shifts
when DBS is applied to such brain systems (see Panksepp, 1982).
Our goal here is to provide a conceptual narrative that captures
the flow of such primal brain processes that are comparatively
hard to analyze explicitly with routine neuroscientific procedures
in humans.
TRANSITIONS FROM “UNKNOWING” TO “KNOWING”
FORMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
From our perspective, a critical distinction becomes evident:
from a rudimentary state of autonomic awakeness or “unknowing
consciousness” reflecting primal biologically adaptive functions,
brains states first become experienced at anoetic (unknowing)
levels (e.g., bodily felt affective states), from which capacities for
higher forms of consciousness gradually emerged with brain-mind
encephalization. First, the primal experiential levels, provided
“reinforcement” mechanisms for accruing knowledge about the
world (noetic states, reflecting facts about the world). Further
brain encephalization, led to awareness, a higher-order “knowing”
form of consciousness based on semantic and episodic memory
systems,which is encapsulated by Endel Tulving’s concept of“auto-
noetic” consciousness, that provides access to higher meaning-
making processes, reflected best in the arts, literature, and other
cultural processes, that remain poorly understood at the neural
level (Velmans, 1999, 2009; Block, 2005, 2007).1
IMPLICIT ANOETIC CONSCIOUSNESS
The Jamesian (James, 1890) fringe of consciousness – the stream
of consciousness that is so hard to describe and study has been a
mainstay of affective neuroscience (James, 1890; Panksepp, 1982,
1998a, 2005, 2008) a “missing piece” that can be integrated with
our emerging understanding of higher forms of consciousness
(Tulving, 2004, 2005; Vandekerckhove, 2009; Vandekerckhove and
Panksepp, 2009, 2011). The “anoetic” nature of implicit primal
anoetic consciousness consists of a continuous underlying stream
of affective and multisensorial and procedural representations in
an embodied or bodily format such as an autonomic sensation that
are experienced at an unreflective level. It guides associative learn-
ing processes which then gets associated with “object-relations”
in the world, and thereby become ever explicit (Goldman and
Vignemont, 2009; Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011). Such learning
processes yield explicit representations over which one does not
exert direct volitional control until enough higher-order brain
matter (i.e., neocortex) evolved to allow the rudiments of auto-
noetic consciousness which in humans seems to be largely verbally
mediated, but which we believe also be represented as visual and
perhaps other images in pre-linguistic organisms. Thus, on an
implicit level, anoetic consciousness is continuously influencing
mood and behavior, thereby permitting affective and perceptual
experiences to gradually have noetic properties. In other words,
as a continuous state of experiencing of brain and bodily affec-
tive states as associated with external perceptual information
processing, anoetic affects come to be associated with world events.
The transformation of noetic experience into awareness and
autonoetic possibilities, needs further amplification of here-and-
now anoetic and noetic evaluative states of mind by recursive
brain-mind neural systems especially by fronto-parietal networks
(Dehaene et al., 2006; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). Only if the
1There are some resemblances here to Ned Blocks, “phenomenal,” and “access” con-
sciousness, which has been discussed neuroscientifically with respect to the neural
correlates of consciousness (Block, 2005). However, his view does not conceptual-
ize affective states and their role in learning, nor provide a way to conceptualize
how higher forms of consciousness emerge from the lower anoetic and noetic levels
that we think are essential for conceptualizing the hierarchical evolutionary strata
of the brain-mind. Anoetic consciousness can be differentiated from Block’s (1998,
2005) definition of “phenomenal consciousness,” namely what it is like to be in a
first order phenomenal state, encompassing all first-person conscious experiences,
seemingly at both anoetic and noetic levels of experiencing, but need to be overtly
reportable (hence a human phenomenon), while for us anoetic consciousness, by
its very nature, is considered to reflect rudimentary implicit affective and perceptual
brain states that are valenced, and can be possible studied in animal models because
one can evaluate the affective properties of brain states as with DBS procedures.
Related feelings are never unexperienced in humans, and DBS research provides
experimental access to such shared feeling processes.
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experience gets intense enough and therefore salient, one is able
to describe, and/or reflect on it (Vandekerckhove and Panksepp,
2011). The underlying autonomic and organic state processes,
arising from viscerally enriched subcortical circuits extend from
the mesencephalic central gray regions, through medial dien-
cephalic regions, toward cingulate and orbitomedial frontal cor-
tices (Panksepp, 2007) are continuously contributing to the flow
and fluctuations of anoetic consciousness that provides a critical
foundation and background for higher cognitive activities.
Anoetic and noetic forms of consciousness bridge the geneti-
cally provided potentials for brain-mind states with explicit expe-
riential contents to engender higher forms of consciousness that
are rich in explicit conscious awareness (i.e., knowing what one
is experiencing). This progression reflects how primal phenome-
nal experiences can be integrated through unconscious learning
and memory processes toward an ideational enrichment of higher
mental life. Thereby, a variety of changes in experiences, thoughts,
and actions might be attributable to past events, including priming
effects, unconscious saving effects in relearning, as well as cer-
tain forms of proactive and retroactive interferences (Kihlstrom
et al., 2007). Within this continuum and from the perspective of
noetic consciousness, anoetic neural substrates of consciousness
may come to contain many implicit stored experiences, such as
early childhood experiences. They no longer come into explicit
awareness at later stages of development but which, because of var-
ious affective priming processes, may still arouse affective qualia
that influence higher awareness processes. For instance, anoetic
experiential feelings may be triggered by perceptually related asso-
ciated situations or memories and may influence behavior in daily
life (Squire and Zola-Morgan, 1991), while not being recognized
by the individuals themselves.
Even if is not well recognized how behaviors are accompa-
nied by and caused by apparently free-floating affective anoetic
states, something that may be inherent to such implicitly trig-
gered anoetic states is the possibility that what may be cognitively
unconscious need not be affectively unexperienced or visually
unseen at a primary-process level. Indeed, many priming para-
digms have shown that cueing information can still be implicitly
perceived even when there is no awareness of perceiving it, and
this information can be causally efficacious in enhancing target
identification when attention is oriented to the location of the
correct cueing stimuli (Merickle et al., 2001). Similarly, uncon-
scious affective information such as emotional words presented at
the visually undetectable levels, can reliably modify mood states
(Shevrin et al., 2012). Likewise, work with neonatally decorticated
animals, along with work with congenitally anencephalic children
(Merker, 2007), demonstrate that one can have primary affec-
tive, sensory, and perceptual here-and-now implicit experiences
with very minimal capacity to project and transform them into
higher mental processes or awareness (Panksepp, 1998a, 2005;
Shewmon et al., 1999). A hemi-neglect patient who suffered a
lesion in the right parietal cortex will find it difficult or impos-
sible to shift attention to the left side or to be explicitly sensitive
to anything on the left side (Driver and Vuilleumier, 2001). In
such hemi-neglect, there is preservation of initial sensory path-
ways, in line with many other studies which have shown that
considerable residual processing can still take place for neglected
or extinguished stimuli without reaching the patient’s awareness.
Like many forms of implicit processing, this residual processing
can modulate what enters into patient’s awareness. These exam-
ples also illustrate that the higher cognitive regions of the brain
are not essential for the generation of anoetic consciousness. How-
ever, with the maturation of the neocortex to sustain higher mental
processes, those superordinate abilities probably have an intrinsic
capacity to modulate lower brain-mind processes, which may be
the source of the Freudian dynamic unconscious (among the more
cephalized animals), which can only be scientifically well studied
in humans.
ANOETIC CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE ORIGINS OF “EMBODIED AWARE
STATES”
Being a “primal” embodied mental state, anoetic consciousness
involves the capacity to experience body and world with sensory-
perceptual immediacy and affective qualities that may emerge into
higher-order awareness. It is the general representational contents
of the anoetic and noetic states that determine the phenomenal
character of autonoetic awareness (Churchland, 2005). The flow
of these anoetic experiences does not dominate in awareness. It has
no explicit object as most full-blown emotional states have (e.g.,
I am angry because. . .). In contrast, awareness involves focused
attention to something specific inside or outside the organism
in the world. Conscious awareness – the experience that one is
experiencing – adds a new reflective dimension to conscious-
ness (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). Aware experience reflects
the experience of something both perceptual and experientially
contextualized along with an internal higher recognition of own-
ership of the experience. Processes of integration and differentia-
tion play a crucial role in the process of emergence of conscious
awareness achieved in short time periods, even of hundreds of
millisecond (Edelman, 1993, 2003; Tononi and Edelman, 1998;
Crick and Koch, 2003). These representations are the result of
an underlying anoetic processing that lead to the construction of
specific knowledge, an affectively motivated reaction or a thought.
Anoetic consciousness becomes apparent in explicit awareness in a
propositional format only when intense enough to mandate delib-
erative actions. Awareness is facilitated when attention is directed
toward those external sensations and internal experiences that
would otherwise not be perceived. In daily life, the experience
of anoetic consciousness in normal subjects is less intense and
more in the background of these subtle experiences, for instance
feelings of familiarity in social situations. This may reflect inhi-
bition/regulation that higher cortical ventromedial processes can
impose on subcortical processes. Even if one does not talk about
it, anoetic consciousness still may be expressed in body posture,
gestures, and tone of speech. In the meanwhile, it is characterized
by fluctuations of affective-somatosensorial background intensity
as anoetic qualia are generated (Frijda et al., 1991). Such back-
ground psycho-physiological process entails continuous primary
evaluations that gradually influence the affective ways in which
one relates to the world, which in itself is quite distinct from var-
ious cognitive evaluations. These affective feelings (e.g., incipient
desires and fears) and homeostatic ones (e.g., hunger and thirst)
exist in order to help shape preferences intrinsically so as to antic-
ipate the potential positive and negative consequences of actions.
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The individual may choose to do various things as underlying
causes of the anoetic affective flow and associated physiological
changes fluctuate (e.g., increased blood pressure, skin conduc-
tance, and heart rate). These affectively rich emotional “action
tendencies” that organisms experience, facilitate not only urges to
act – for instance facilitation of enthusiasm via increased brain
dopamine release, but also serve as a prelude to intended actions
within higher levels of consciousness (Panksepp, 2007). Asso-
ciated affective arousals are endogenously further regulated by
other biogenic amine transmitters such as norepinephrine and
serotonin, contributing to the intensity of anoetic conscious-
ness, that may gradually emerge into explicit awareness when
raw experience is transformed into noetic consciousness that
fuels autonoetic awareness. Parallel and sequential implicit inter-
nal affective and cognitive processing and re-processing enables
us here, through learning and memory, to give implicit and
explicit meaning to our internal experience and affective expres-
sions within both environmental as well as social interactions in
ways that can help promote cognitive thought and planning of
actions.
UNDERLYING MULTIMODAL FEEDBACK
The flow of anoetic consciousness is dependent on sensory-
perceptual signal integration and ongoing dynamic activity in core
limbic and brain-stem value systems (Edelman, 1993, 2003). If
subcortical signaling is altered it follows that the global interocep-
tive feeling changes and the tendency to adaptively process affective
changes related to the world changes too. For instance, research on
emotion imitation (Hennenlotter et al., 2009) showed that den-
ervation of muscles necessary to the facial expression of emotion
leads to changes in central circuitry of emotion. Deafferentation
of frown area with botulinum-toxin diminishes left amygdalar
activity and functional connectivity between amygdala and sev-
eral brain-stem regions implicated in the control of automatic
arousal (Hennenlotter et al., 2009). The impaired feedback and
integration of negative affect-related signals results in diminished
activity of affective networks that control the anoetic quality of
one’s background experiences. Also when related brain areas are
impaired, this updating function becomes impaired which nor-
mally helps thus to maintain and continuously update affective
experience and the capacity to detect and interpret higher-order
affective information such as own internal state learning and
memory that is largely unconscious. Integral information pro-
cessing in anoetic consciousness is thus continuously instantiated
by multimodal feedback and large-scale neurodynamics result-
ing in accompanying brain neurochemical/electrical changes that
regulate information processing, through presently poorly under-
stood “laws of affect,” perhaps by conversion of silent glutamateric
synapses to active ones (Panksepp and Biven, 2012).
ANOETIC SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS VERSUS SELF-CONCEPTS
By bringing phenomenal experiences into reflective conscious-
ness – we affectively experience how we “are” which may govern
how we intuitively feel how we should behave in the world. These
increasingly higher-order experiences are directly related to the
affective conditions that inundate the core-self, a virtual neural
representation of the body, the proposed foundation of all forms
of consciousness – a cross-species construct for organismic mental
coherence (Panksepp, 1998b; Northoff and Panksepp, 2008). The
neural instantiation of anoetic experiences of the core-self have
been suggested to be related to subcortical networks in the mid-
line of the brainstem, projecting from the periaqueductal gray
to basal ganglia such as the ventral striatum, and reciprocally
to medial frontal cortical regions. These brain regions, critical
for consciousness, may constitute a fundamental neural substrate
for the free-flow of primary-process affective states, and thereby
the construction of higher-order self-representations. This primal
experiences of an affective core-self, may give rise to the universal
global experience of personal existence, initially unreflective (i.e.,
not aware of itself), but providing a foundation for higher forms of
selfhood and identity through learning and increasing complex-
ity of perceptions, cognitive appraisals, and higher-order feelings
(Slaby and Stephan, 2008). We would postulate, that the anoetic
self involves feelings of singularity and unity that defines a creature
as a singular entity, and as a coherent human being in our species
(Damasio, 2003; Prebble et al., 2013) coloring autobiographical
episodic memories with affects, and determining which memories
we most easily cherish and seemingly spontaneously recall and
which ones we try to avoid.
Aside from the primary experience of a coherent sense of self
(Damasio, 2003; Prebble et al., 2013), the higher mental repre-
sentation of the self, on the other hand, reflects how memories
related to critical life experiences are integrated into a higher-order
affective-cognitive schema. This is supported by the ability of the
brain to represent the I’ness – namely the primal viscero-somatic
body – the core-self – within memory, provides for both the inter-
nally experienced and externally evident coherence of organisms
(Panksepp, 1998a, 2009; Northoff and Panksepp, 2008). These pri-
mal self-structures/functions may provide a fundamental basis for
learning and knowing about ourselves, since the primary-process
core-of-being is densely connected with many higher associa-
tion networks, like the episodic and the semantic memory system
(Vandekerckhove, 2009).The higher-order semantic definition of
the self or self-concept, extracted out of semantic and episodic
autobiography, is the model that we typically use to explicitly orga-
nize our experiences and actions (Dennett and Westbury, 2000).
However, this is granted by the intrinsic integrative circuits that
already exist at brain-stem levels (Solms and Panksepp, 2012). We
propose that the anoetic affective core-self-experience gives the
individual a sense of self in the moment, the episodic self con-
sisting of the unified experience of the self in the present moment
together with the self as integrated with past experiences and future
aspirations. It results in a diachronic self-experience, that has
substantial temporal stability. It allows individuals to experience
themselves as being the same person over time (Panksepp, 1998b;
Panksepp and Biven,2012). The semantic-conceptual self however,
a higher-order abstraction, consists of the semantic representation
of oneself over time without being permeated as richly by this
affective coloring of the anoetic self.
The difference between anoetic self-experience and semantic
self-concept can be illustrated by an example of an elderly woman
in later stages of Alzheimer’s dementia described by Klein (2013a)
who kept her anoetic self-experience intact but lost her episodic
self. The women experienced a variety of memory problems
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typically associated with late stages of dementia (e.g., loss of per-
sonal recollections, difficulties in object naming, word finding
difficulties, temporal disorientation, etc.). In contrast, interview-
ing revealed that she maintained a sense of herself as an entity,
albeit one beset by confusion. Her anoetic self, or what Klein
defines as ontological self, did not collapse as a result of her cogni-
tive deficits and loss of access to a variety of self-relevant sources
of knowledge. Rather she kept an intact subjective sense of herself
as a living, experiencing entity, and behaved exactly as one would
expect a conscious, subjective entity to react to the cognitive chaos
engendered by the severity of the disease process that was ravaging
the higher reaches of her mind (Klein, 2013b).
REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS
Reflective consciousness implies primarily the capacity to have
thoughts about experiences, as well as about thoughts, aware-
ness of awareness – or meta-awareness much of which is probably
unique to humans requiring expansive neocortical tissues that per-
mit linguistic-symbolic transformation of thoughts and remem-
bered experiences, into autobiographical perspectives (Panksepp,
2005). Mostly, explicit object-related reflective awareness springs
into the foreground when the automaticity of being is not enough
to handle the world. If attention within higher brain regions inten-
sifies, reflection starts gradually to become explicit via a stream of
sensorial and perceptual representations of objects in the world
and events related to them. Reflective consciousness implies an
explicit cognitive relationship with anoetic experiences, namely
of the one who is aware and that of which one is aware. Infor-
mation that becomes processed in higher awareness is then at
the focus of attention, selected from competing and cooperative
information channels to become more environmentally adapted
and hence, cognitively predictive (Brown and Brüne, 2012). This
view can also be compared with Block’s (2005) notion of “access
consciousness” as it refers to the ability to manipulate informa-
tion for verbal reports, planning and reasoning and crucially, for
higher-order behavioral control. It thus also introduces the capac-
ity to learn and to describe one’s own internal representations at
higher cognitive levels that imply increasing “awareness” reflecting
linguistic abilities of an individual ending up “knowing” some-
thing about his or her own internal states (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992;
Cleeremans, 2008, 2011).
EPISODIC MEMORY AND AUTONOETIC CONSCIOUSNESS
Episodic memory is a past- and future-oriented, context-
embedded neurocognitive memory system that re-presents auto-
biographical events from one’s past (Tulving, 2002, 2004, 2005).
Tulving (1985, 1999, 2001) initially defined episodic remem-
bering as cognitive, symbolic, and representable. It involves the
capacity to reflect upon information about past events, one’s
feelings during those events, and a timeline of when those
experiences occurred, together with the ability to choose an
event or social interaction and to recognize whether it occurred
before or after some other point of reference (Robinson, 1986).
Episodic memories are explicit events of one’s past, stored in a
past-oriented, context-embedded, neurocognitive memory system
(Tulving, 1999, 2002, 2004, 2005). Still, the consolidation and recall
of these episodic memories have been immersed in and emerged
from and henceforth guided by states of anoetic affective con-
sciousness. Thereby, implicit self-relevance becomes intimately
related to each individual’s unique feelings, thoughts, goals, and
behaviors. Autonoetic consciousness as Klein (2013b) defines it, is
intrinsic to, and dependent on episodic memory – i.e., it is con-
stituted from “episodic” memories and sustains a relational (i.e.,
contingent) connection to episodic memory content.
Episodic memory constitutes autonoetic consciousness,
whereas autobiographical memory involves autonoetic conscious-
ness as long as it is episodic autobiographical memory. Autobio-
graphical memory in itself is thus not sufficient for autonoetic
consciousness. Autonoetic consciousness involves the retrieval of
memories within time and context in an explicit way,constituted of
self-reflective mental states. As mentioned before, it also contains
the direction of attention into the future or prospection, whereas
autobiographical memory can only be retrograde and semantic in
its nature accompanied with noetic consciousness. Episodic mem-
ory constitutes an experience of continuity in time whereby the
self is connected to previous points of time related with distinct
feelings of personal agency and ownership. This highest form of
consciousness makes use of the projection of the self in the con-
text of future opportunities and possibilities, within the context
of retrospective memories and prospective plans. It makes recur-
rent targeting of the “self” as a meta-representational mechanism
where higher-order representations are targeting other possible
representations of oneself (Klein et al., 2004; Cleeremans, 2008,
2011).
Tulving (2005) defined episodic memory, as differing from
other forms of memory, its operations requiring an extended sense
of self that can engage in mental time-travel. It targets past events,
and integrates future hopes and possibilities. Reflective autonoetic
consciousness, informs us about self-relevant sequences of events,
enhancing the differentiation of our memories into personally rel-
evant categories. It is accompanied with the experience – that the
“I” (of agency) is the cause of “my own” thoughts and actions,
or “ownership” of one’s experiences (Klein, 2013b). Awareness
here depends thus also on having a high order representation of
oneself as being in a particular state, experienced time and con-
text, a process that is subtended by the prefrontal cortex (Lau and
Rosenthal, 2011).
The semantic memory system, on the other hand, contains
information that is remote from what most people envision as
remembering, for it holds no sense of personal time or affec-
tive context (Gardiner, 2000; Markowitsch et al., 2003; Tulving,
2005; Vandekerckhove et al., 2005; Gregg et al., 2006), and does
not require the explicit re-experiencing of past events (Klein
et al., 2004). Noetic self-awareness is the awareness of one’s self
in semantic ways, characterized by personality traits and factual
self-knowledge, whereas autonoetic self-consciousness refers to
explicit self-awareness in a specific affectively tinged time-space
context and continuum.
THE ANOETIC WARMTH OF REMEMBRANCE
The episodic remembrance of one’s own life experiences is filled
with the pervasive affective consciousness associated with specific
times, places, and events. It involves a detailed sensory affective-
perceptual re-experiencing of events, and this is importantly
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related to anoetic consciousness. The reliving of the subjective
experiences is closely linked to an affective evaluation of the sig-
nificance of these past experiences for oneself and with respect to
one’s previous and present position in the world (Markowitsch
and Staniloiu, 2012). In James’s (1890) view, episodic remember-
ing and autonoetic awareness is described as “remembrance” with
“warmth and intimacy” referring, we propose, to the phenom-
enal, self-referential flavor of anoetic consciousness and to the
remembering of past value-laden episodic events or autonoetic
awareness. One can actually feel oneself as if one was in previous
scenarios. Episodic memory is especially dependent on the encod-
ing and consolidation of many differentiated cognitive aspects
each with many elaborations, with the remembered anoetic, affec-
tive, and environmental contexts in which they occurred. This
memory system is enriched by characteristics such as the feeling
of selfhood and agency, vividness; temporality; contextuality of
color, taste, and smell; affective richness; and cognitive subtlety.
The richness of affective coloring and value presumably arises
from a host of affective systems, coded by diverse neuropeptides,
which gives valuative richness to life (Panksepp, 1998a; Solms and
Panksepp, 2012). As Klein (2013b) discusses, referring to Zahavi
(2005) and James (1890), episodic memory connects to the past
not by logical inference like it is the case in semantic memory,
but by “pre-reflective directly givenness” (e.g., Zahavi, 2005). It
is a feeling that “my current mental state stands for and thus is
representative of an experience in my personal past” (e.g., James,
1890). Accompanied by anoetic consciousness it reflects a sense
of affective attachment to my past, reflected in this warmth and
intimacy or feeling of familiarity which is part of the valuative
subjective quality of the mental event. And this feeling accompa-
nying episodic recollection is made possible by episodic memory’s
association with autonoetic awareness. It follows that impairment
in any of these episodic crucial characteristics or components,
such as self-reflection, self-agency, self-ownership, and personal
temporality should produce, in varying degrees, specific circum-
scribed impairments in episodic recollection (Klein, 2013b). Klein
(2013b) illustrates this by R.B. who suffered from a serious head
injury from a car accident, a number of cognitive impairments
such as retrograde and anterograde amnesia for events in close
temporal proximity to the accident. R.B. was still able to remember
particular incidents from his life accompanied by clear temporal,
spatial, and self-referential content. However, he no longer felt
ownership of the memories, warmth and intimacy, or autonoetic
consciousness.
In contrast, semantic memories do not have these abundant
dependencies on anoetic consciousness – neither the contextual
variables nor associated self-referential dynamics that give episodic
memories such personal closeness and feelings of ownership
and selfhood. Semantic memory can be self-referential and spa-
tial (Klein, 2013a) as it consists of factual knowledge about
the self and world abstracted from the specific episodic con-
texts from which the knowledge had been acquired. This dis-
tinction between episodic and semantic memorial experiences
can also be seen, as Klein (2013b) described, as one of differ-
ences in manner of acquaintance (e.g., Russell, 1916/1999). We
are acquainted with semantic pastness indirectly via inference,
whereas our acquaintance with episodic pastness is directly given
as the phenomenological feeling that we are re-living our past
(Klein, 2013b).
Severe impairment of episodic memory retrieval, particularly
of the emotional information from specific autobiographical con-
tent has been found in patients with lesions that include amyg-
daloid complexes and related circuitry with forebrain regions
(Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2012). The amygdala’s main func-
tion is to affectively charge cues, especially in aggressive, fearful,
and sexual domains, so that explicit or implicit memory events of
a specific anoetic significance can be successfully searched within
the appropriate neural nets and thereby re-activated (Markow-
itsch and Staniloiu, 2012). Emotionally stressful life events impact
the amygdala and the hippocampus – areas with a rich density of
glucocorticoid receptors – so as to consolidate especially stress-
ful memories. The Papez circuit and the basolateral limbic loop
(mediodorsal nucleus of the thalamus, subcallosal area, amyg-
dala, and interconnecting fiber) are also involved. The Papez and
the basolateral limbic circuit represent a group of “bottleneck-
structures” that are interconnected and of high relevance for the
extraction of the affective, somatosensorial, and social significance
of new incoming information (Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2012).
In contrast, when damage involves just the semantic memory sys-
tem, especially of the hippocampus, patients may forget personal
facts and beliefs – where and when they were born, details of
their physical appearance, but their anoetic self remains relatively
intact.
CONCLUSION AND SUMMATION: UNKNOWING ANOETIC
CONSCIOUSNESS GUIDES THE EMERGENCE OF KNOWING
CONSCIOUSNESS
Anoetic consciousness has here been envisioned as a stream of pre-
reflective affective and sensorial perceptual consciousness essential
for the waking state of the organism in the absence of an explicit
self-referential awareness of associated cognitive contents. This
state of affective consciousness acts as a bridge that may take us
from deeply unconscious information processing and primary-
process affective and perceptual consciousness toward the possi-
bility of knowing (noetic) levels of consciousness situated within
the basal ganglia that mediate learning and memory and higher
regions of the brain, such as the neocortex which allows for
mental time-travel from the permutations of these memories.
In other words, unknowing consciousness, namely anoetic con-
sciousness, allows various primordial affective feelings, and the
related affective information processing of learning and mem-
ory mechanisms, especially in brain structures known as the basal
ganglia (amygdala, nucleus accumbens, bed nuclei of the stria ter-
minalis) to connect up with knowing noetic, and especially, auto-
noetic consciousness. Anoetic self-experience influences global
phenomenal experiences – unconditional states of being – which
not only modulate the affective tone of one’s behavior, but provide
critical information for learning and memory. As primarily pre-
conceptual phenomena, anoetic affective experiences, can be dif-
ferentiated into various intrinsic valuative processes of the brain
(emotional, homeostatic, and sensory affects) that become con-
tinuously part of actual information processing and existential
perception of the world. Later in development, when reflec-
tion is possible, those primal affects act as free-flowing streams
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underlying the more cognitively detailed aspects of our con-
tinuously ongoing cognitive-noetic and autonoetic information
processing as thoughts, images, fantasies, expectations, and antic-
ipations. This is very similar to the “free flow of consciousness”
that James (1890) talked about. In contrast to noetic conscious-
ness, autonoetic consciousness refers to the reflective capacity to
mentally represent a continuing existence one that is embedded in
specific episodic contexts and associated with remembered expe-
riences with affective quality – from “warmth and intimacy” to
“dread and alienation.”
Noetic consciousness is associated with the knowledge that spe-
cific facts have happened in the past, but it has no access to a
fully resolved, affectively rich awareness of one’s ongoing subjec-
tive experience. Noetic self-awareness is the awareness of one’s
self in semantic ways, characterized by personality traits and fac-
tual self-knowledge, whereas autonoetic consciousness refers to
explicit self-awareness, and/or the explicit awareness of something
or someone else in a specific affectively tinged time-space con-
text. This highest episodic self-referential form of consciousness
makes use of the projection of the self in the context of future
opportunities and possibilities, within the context of retrospective
memories and prospective plans. As a self-generative, self-knowing
state, attention in autonoetic consciousness can thus be directed
to memories of the past – of being retrospective, with past anoetic
flows of consciousness available in the “real-time” present, and
planning and dreaming of the future in a prospective form of
autonoetic consciousness. It is accompanied with a sense of per-
sonal agency; that is, the belief that I am the cause of my thoughts
and actions, a sense of personal ownership; that is, the feeling that
my thoughts and acts belong to me, and the ability to think about
time as an unfolding of personal happenings centered about the
self (Klein, 2013a).
This form of mentalizing, surely most highly developed in
humans, is heavily mediated by medial temporal lobe (hippocam-
pal) and frontal lobe evolution and microstructure (Buckner and
Carroll, 2007; Fleming et al., 2010). Neural correlates of noetic
(knowing) consciousness relate to various memory abilities, espe-
cially declarative (factual) memory, whereas anoetic consciousness
is heavily linked, to raw sensorial and perceptual abilities, to var-
ious subcortical affective processes, and intrinsic affective value
structures, and hence, is more related to limbic and paralimbic
structures associated intrinsically with the more implicit free-flow
of affective consciousness. We suggest that what came first in the
evolution of consciousness, namely the anoetic forms, sustain pri-
macy in the construction of the higher, noetic and especially auto-
noetic forms that are of such critical importance for our individual
decision-making abilities and autobiographical existences.
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